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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to re-
liably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the
switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks on actuator and sensor signals,
in the presence of unbounded stochastic process and measurement noise signals. We model
the systems under attack as hidden mode stochastic switched linear systems with unknown
inputs and propose the use of a multiple-model inference algorithm to tackle these security
issues. Moreover, we characterize fundamental limitations to resilient estimation (e.g., up-
per bound on the number of tolerable signal attacks) and discuss the topics of attack detec-
tion, identification and mitigation under this framework. Simulation examples of switching
and false data injection attacks on a benchmark system and an IEEE 68-bus test system
show the efficacy of our approach to recover resilient (i.e., asymptotically unbiased) state
estimates as well as to identify and mitigate the attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are systems in which computational and communication
elements collaborate to control physical entities, and for networked CPS, the Internet
of Things (IoT) interlinks these physical and cyber worlds in a continuous and close
interaction. The cyber-physical coupling introduces new functions to control systems
and improves their performance. However, control systems are also exposed to new cy-
ber vulnerabilities. Such systems, which include the power grid, autonomous vehicles,
medical devices, etc, are usually safety-critical and if compromised or malfunctioning,
can cause serious harm to the controlled physical entities and the people operating or
utilizing them. Recent incidents of attacks on CPS, e.g., the Maroochy water breach,
the StuxNet computer worm and various industrial security incidents [Ca´rdenas et al.
2008; Farwell and Rohozinski 2011], highlight a need for CPS and IoT security and for
new designs of resilient estimation and control.
Literature review. Much of the early research focus has been on the characteri-
zation of undetectable attacks and on attack detection and identification techniques,
which range from a simple application of data time-stamps in [Zhu and Martı´nez 2013]
to anomaly detection methods using residuals (e.g., [Mo and Sinopoli 2010; Weimer
et al. 2012; Kwon et al. 2013]) with empirically chosen thresholds to trade-off be-
tween false alarms and probability of anomaly/attack detection. On the other hand,
attack mitigation is typically considered from two perspectives—preventive and reac-
tive [Co´mbita et al. 2015]—where preventive mitigation identifies and removes system
vulnerabilities to prevent exploitation (e.g., [Dan and Sandberg 2010]) while reactive
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attack mitigation initiates countermeasures after detecting an attack and is mainly
studied using game-theoretic methods (e.g., [Ma et al. 2013; Zhu and Basar 2015]).
However, the ability to reliably estimate the true system states despite attacks (i.e.,
resilient state estimates) is just as desirable, if not more than purely attack detection
or attack mitigation; thus, this problem has garnered considerable interest in recent
years because the availability of resilient state estimates would, among others, allow
for continued operation with the same controllers as in the case without attacks or for
locational marginal pricing of electricity based on the real unbiased state information
despite attacks. This problem has been studied both in the context of static systems
(e.g., [Liu et al. 2011; Kosut et al. 2011]) as well as dynamic systems as in this paper.
For deterministic linear dynamic systems under actuator and sensor signal attacks
(e.g., via false data injection [Cardenas et al. 2008; Mo and Sinopoli 2010; Pasqualetti
et al. 2013]), the resilient state estimation problem has been mapped onto an `0 op-
timization problem that is NP-hard [Pasqualetti et al. 2013; Fawzi et al. 2014]; thus,
a relaxation to a convex problem is considered in [Fawzi et al. 2014]. Further exten-
sions [Pajic et al. 2014; Pajic et al. 2015] compute the worst-case bound on the state
estimate error in the presence of additive noise errors with known bounds, while [Yong
et al. 2016] considers the resilient state estimation problem that is robust to bounded
multiplicative and additive modeling and noise errors. However, these approaches do
not apply in the presence of additive stochastic (unbounded) noise signals, which is
one of the security issues we consider in this paper. On the other hand, [Mishra et al.
2015] consider systems with stochastic noise signals but with only sensor attacks.
In addition, attacks that exploit the switching vulnerability of CPS and IoT or that
alter its network topology have been recently identified as a serious CPS security con-
cern. Some instances of such vulnerability are attacks on the circuit breakers of a
smart grid [Liu et al. 2013] or on the logic mode (e.g., failsafe mode) of a traffic in-
frastructure [Ghena et al. 2014], on the meter/sensor data network topology [Kim and
Tong 2013] and on the power system network topology [Weimer et al. 2012]. However,
to the best of our knowledge, no resilient state estimators for dynamic systems have
been developed to deal with this new class of attacks.
Our techniques are based on simultaneous input and state estimation (see, e.g.,
[Gillijns and De Moor 2007a; Gillijns and De Moor 2007b; Yong et al. 2016b]), where
data injection attack vectors can be modeled as unknown inputs of dynamical systems.
Of particular importance to our approach are the stability and optimality properties
as well as their relationship to strong detectability [Yong et al. 2016b]. Inspired by
the multiple-model approach (see, e.g., [Bar-Shalom et al. 2002; Mazor et al. 1998]
and references therein), our previous work [Yong et al. 2016a] introduced an inference
algorithm that estimates hidden modes, unknown inputs and states simultaneously,
which we now propose as the key tool to achieve resilient estimation.
Contributions. In this paper, we introduce a resilient state estimation algorithm
that outputs reliable estimates of the true system states despite two classes of attacks.
To our best knowledge, our resilient estimation algorithm is the first that addresses
switching attacks as well as the first that successfully deals with simultaneous actua-
tor and sensor attacks in the presence of unbounded stochastic noise signals.
Our approach is built upon a general purpose inference algorithm developed in our
previous work [Yong et al. 2016a] for hidden mode stochastic switched linear systems
with unknown inputs. The first novelty of the present paper lies in the modeling of
switching and false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems in the presence
of unbounded stochastic noise signals as an instance of this system class. In doing so,
we show that unbiased state estimates (i.e., resilient state estimates) can be asymp-
totically recovered with the algorithm in [Yong et al. 2016a]. Secondly, we characterize
fundamental limitations to resilient estimation that is useful for preventative miti-
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gation, such as the upper bound on the number of correctable/tolerable attacks, and
consider the subject of attack detection. In addition, we provide sufficient conditions
for designing unidentifiable attacks (from the attacker’s perspective) and also suffi-
cient conditions to obtain resilient state estimates even when the attacks are not iden-
tified (from the system operator/defender’s perspective). Finally, we design an attack-
mitigating and stabilizing feedback controller that contributes to the literature on non-
game-theoretic reactive attack mitigation.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in [Yong et al. 2015], and this
paper expands on those results and includes new sections on attack detection and
identification, as well as attack mitigation.
Paper Organization. Section 2 provides a motivating example of switching and
data injection attacks on a multi-area power system. In Section 3, we describe the mod-
eling of switching and false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems and state
our assumptions/models of the system and attacker. Section 4.1 reviews the multiple-
model algorithm and its nice properties from [Yong et al. 2016a] and provides an inter-
pretation of the general purpose algorithm in the context of resilient state estimation.
The rest of Section 4 is dedicated to the novel study of fundamental limitations to
attack resilience. Next, we focus on attack detection and identification in Section 5,
and provide some sufficient conditions as guidelines for system operators/designers,
while we design an attack-mitigating feedback controller in Section 6. Section 7 then
demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed approach on a benchmark system and
an IEEE 68-bus test system. Finally, we conclude with some remarks in Section 8.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To motivate the problem of resilient state estimation of stochastic cyber-physical sys-
tems under switching and false data injection attacks, let us consider an example of
a power system with 3 control areas, each consisting of generators and loads, with
transmission/tie-lines providing interconnections between areas (see Figure 1).
A malicious agent is assumed to have access to circuit breakers that control the tie-
lines (similar to [Liu et al. 2013]), and is thus able to sever the connection between
control areas. Depending on the topology of the tie-line interconnection graph, such
attacks may correspond to a node/vertex/bus attack (disconnection of a control area
from all others) or a link/edge/line attack (disabling of a specific tie-line between two
control areas), i.e., the power flow across the tie lines is altered. Moreover, we assume
that the system dynamics and state measurements are subject to random noise and
attacks via additive false data injection in the actuator and sensor signals.
The goal of resilient state estimation is thus to obtain unbiased state estimates de-
spite switching attacks, i.e., attacks on switches/circuit breakers, and data injection
attacks on actuators and sensors.
+
−
Control Area 1
+
−Control Area 2
+
−Control Area 3
Circuit Breaker 1 Circuit Breaker 3
Circuit Breaker 2
Fig. 1: A 3-area power system with radial topology (corresponding to node/bus attack).
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3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1. Attack Modeling
We consider two different classes of possibly time-varying attacks on cyber-physical
systems (CPS):
Data Injection Attacks. Attacks on actuator and sensor signals via manipulation
or injection with “false” signals of unknown magnitude and location (i.e., subset of
attacked actuators or sensors). In other words, signal attacks consist of both signal
magnitude attacks and signal location attacks. Examples: Denial of service, decep-
tive attacks via data injection [Cardenas et al. 2008; Pasqualetti et al. 2013].
Switching Attacks. Attacks on the switching mechanism that changes the sys-
tem’s mode of operation, or on the sensor data or interconnection network topology,
which we will also refer to as mode attacks. Examples: Attack on circuit breakers
[Liu et al. 2013], power network topology [Weimer et al. 2012], sensor data network
[Kim and Tong 2013] and logic switch of a traffic infrastructure [Ghena et al. 2014].
3.1.1. Data Injection Attacks. For clarity of exposition, we assume for the moment that
there is only one mode of operation, and that the linear system dynamics is not per-
turbed by stochastic noise signals:
xk+1 = Akxk +Bk(uk + d
a
k), yk = Ckxk +Dk(uk + d
a
k) + d
s
k,
where xk ∈ Rn is the continuous state, yk ∈ R` is the sensor output, uk ∈ Rm is
the known input, dak ∈ Rm and dsk ∈ R` are attack signals that are injected into the
actuators and sensors, respectively. The attack signals are sparse, i.e., if sensor i ∈
{1, · · · , `} is not attacked then necessarily ds,(i)k = 0 for all time steps k; otherwise
d
s,(i)
k can take any value. Since we do not know which sensor is attacked, we refer to
this uncertainty as the signal location attack, and the arbitrary values that ds,(i)k can
take as the signal magnitude attack. The same observation holds for the attacks on
actuators dak.
If, in addition, we have knowledge of which the actuators and sensors are vulnerable
to data injection attacks, we will incorporate this information using Gk and Hk to
result in following system dynamics
xk+1 = Akxk +Bkuk +Gkd
a
k, yk = Ckxk +Dkuk +Dkd
a
k +Hkd
s
k.
If no such knowledge is available, Gk = Bk, Dk = Dk and Hk = I. Moreover, in some
cases, the actuator and sensor attack signals are known to be mixed and cannot be
separated. In order to take this into consideration, we represent the potentially ‘mixed’
attack signals with dk and introduce corresponding Gk and Hk matrices to obtain
xk+1 = Akxk +Bkuk +Gkdk, yk = Ckxk +Dkuk +Hkdk.
In the absence of mixed attack signals, dk = [dak d
s
k], Gk =
[
Gk 0
]
and Hk =
[
Dk Hk
]
.
The description of these matrices will be made more precise in Section 3.2.
3.1.2. Switching Attacks. On the other hand, a system may have multiple modes of op-
eration, denoted by the set Qm of cardinality tm , |Qm|, either through the presence
of switching mechanisms or different configurations/topologies of the sensor data or
interconnection network, i.e., each mode qk ∈ Qm has its corresponding set of system
matrices, {Aqkk , Bqkk , Cqkk , Dqkk , Gqkk , Hqkk }. A switching attack or mode attack then refers
to the ability of an attacker to choose and change the mode of operation qk without the
knowledge of the system operator/defender.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of a switched linear system with unknown inputs as a hybrid au-
tomaton with two modes, q and q′, where the system dynamics in each mode is linear.
Attacker Model Assumptions. We do not constrain the malicious signal magni-
tude attack to be a signal of any type (random or strategic) nor to follow any model,
thus no prior ‘useful’ knowledge of the dynamics of dk is available (uncorrelated with
{d`} for all k 6= `, {w`} and {v`} for all `).
3.2. System Description
In this section, we take the perspective of a system operator/defender, i.e., as one with
the goal of obtaining resilient/reliable state estimates. Thus, our techniques include
the modeling of the system in a way that facilitates the design of a resilient state
estimation algorithm. Since we now assume that the system is perturbed by random,
unbounded process and measurement noise signals, we model the switching and false
data injection attacks on a noisy dynamic system using a hidden mode switched linear
discrete-time stochastic system with unknown inputs (i.e., a dynamical system with
multiple modes of operation where the system dynamics in each mode is linear and
stochastic, and the mode and some inputs are not known/measured; cf. Figure 2):
(xk+1, qk)= (A
qk
k xk+B
qk
k u
qk
k +G
qk
k d
qk
k +w
qk
k , qk), xk ∈ Cqk ,
(xk, qk)
+ = (xk, δ
qk(xk)), xk ∈ Dqk , (1)
yk = C
qk
k xk+D
qk
k u
qk
k +H
qk
k d
qk
k +v
qk
k ,
where xk ∈ Rn is the continuous system state and qk ∈ Q = {1, 2, . . . ,N} is the hidden
discrete state or mode, which a malicious attacker has access to, while Cqk and Dqk are
flow and jump sets, and δqk(xk) is the mode transition function. For more details on the
hybrid systems formalism, see [Goebel et al. 2009]. For each mode qk, uqkk ∈ Uqk ⊂ Rm is
the known input, dqkk ∈ Rp the unknown input or attack signal and yk ∈ Rl the output,
whereas the corresponding process noise wqkk ∈ Rn and measurement noise vqkk ∈ Rl
are mutually uncorrelated, zero-mean Gaussian white random signals with known
covariance matrices, Qqkk = E[w
qk
k w
qk>
k ]  0 and Rqkk = E[vqkk vqk>k ]  0, respectively.
Moreover, x0 is independent of vqkk and w
qk
k for all k.
Our stochastic cyber-physical system (CPS) model in (1) is capable of capturing the
unknowns or uncertainties introduced by the switching and data injection attacks to
the system of interest that are both categorical and continuous. The hidden mode al-
lows us to model the categorical nature of the switching and data injection attacks
(mode attack and signal location attack), whereas the unknown input captures the
continuous nature of the signal magnitude attacks.
At any particular time k, the stochastic CPS is in precisely one of its modes, which
is not measured, hence hidden. The following remark motivates the consideration of
more modes than those corresponding to switching/mode attacks given by Qm.
Remark 3.1. Suppose again for simplicity that there is only one mode of operation,
i.e., Qm is a singleton. Then, in the ideal scenario for the system operator/defender
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that the system (Ak, Gk, Ck, Hk) is strongly detectable, unbiased estimates of states xk
can be obtained and the attack signal dk can also be identified [Yong et al. 2016b]. Un-
fortunately, this property does not hold in general. In fact, Theorem 4.3 will reveal that
we need a small number of vulnerable actuators and sensors to enable resilient state
estimation. Thus, we will exploit the sparse nature of the false data injection attacks,
and consider more models/modes in a setQd, each with fewer vulnerable actuators and
sensors to make sure that strong detectability holds.
Thus, the modes we consider in the model set Q , Qm × Qd (as described below),
whose cardinality will be characterized in Theorem 4.4, include
(i) the modes of operation, Qm, that attacked switching mechanisms (e.g., circuit
breakers, relays) operate via access to the jump set Dqk and the mode transition
function δqk(·), or the possible interconnection network topologies that dictate the
system matrices, Aqkk and B
qk
k , and the sensor data network topologies, C
qk
k and
Dqkk , that an attacker can choose (mode attack), as well as
(ii) the different hypotheses for each mode, Qd, about which actuators and sensors
are attacked or not attacked, represented by Gqkk and H
qk
k (signal location attack).
More precisely, we assume that Gqkk , GkIqkG and Hqkk , HkIqkH for some input matri-
ces Gk ∈ Rn×ta and Hk ∈ R`×ts , where ta and ts are the number of actuator and sensor
signals that are vulnerable, respectively. Note that pqka ≤ ta ≤ m and pqks ≤ ts ≤ `, i.e.,
the number of attacked actuator signals pqka under mode/hypothesis qk cannot exceed
the number of vulnerable actuators and in turn cannot exceed the total number of ac-
tuators ma. The same holds for pqks attacked sensors from ts vulnerable sensors out of
` measurements. Moreover, we assume that the maximum total number of attacks is
p , pqka + pqks ≤ p∗, where p∗ is the maximum number of asymptotically correctable
signal attacks (cf. Theorem 4.3 for its characterization).
On the other hand, IqkG ∈ Rta×p and IqkH ∈ Rts×p are index matrices such that
da,qkk , IqkG dk and ds,qkk , IqkH dk represent the subvectors of dk ∈ Rp representing signal
magnitude attacks on the actuators and sensors, respectively. These matrices provide
a means of incorporating information about the way the attacks affect the system, e.g.,
when the same attack is injected to an actuator and a sensor, or if some states are not
attacked, according to a particular hypothesis/mode qk about the signal attack loca-
tion. It is noteworthy that our approach specifies which actuators and sensors are not
attacked, in contrast to the approach in [Mishra et al. 2015], which removes attacked
sensor measurements but is not applicable for actuator attacks.
The following are some examples for choosing Gk, Hk, IqkG and IqkH to encode addi-
tional information about the nature/structure of data injection attacks.
Example 3.2. For a 2-state system with 2 vulnerable actuators and 1 vulnerable
sensor, if the same attack signal is injected into the first actuator and the sensor under
the hypothesis corresponding to mode qk, then Gk = I2,Hk = 1, IqkG = I2 and IqkH = [1 0].
In this case, we obtain Gqkk = I2 and H
qk
k = [1 0].
Example 3.3. For a 3-state system with 3 actuators and 2 sensors, if the first actu-
ator and the second sensor are not vulnerable and there are 3 attacks according to the
hypothesis corresponding to mode qk, then Hk =
[
1
0
]
, IqkG =
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
]
, IqkH = [0 0 1] and
Gk =
[
0 0
1 0
0 1
]
. In this case, we have Gqkk =
[
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
]
and Hqkk =
[
0 0 1
0 0 0
]
.
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System Assumptions. We require that the system is strongly detectable1 in each
mode. In fact, strong detectability is necessary for each mode in order to asymptot-
ically correct the unknown attack signals (also necessary for deterministic systems
[Sundaram and Hadjicostis 2007, Theorem 6]). Note also that strongly detectable sys-
tems need not be stable (cf. example in the proof of Theorem 4.3), but rather that the
strongly undetectable modes of such systems are stable.
Knowledge of the System Operator/Defender. The matrices Aqkk , B
qk
k , G
qk
k , C
qk
k ,
Dqkk and H
qk
k are known, as well as the system assumption of strong detectability in
each mode. Moreover, the only knowledge of the defender concerning the malicious
attacker is about (i) the upper bound on the number of actuators/sensors that can be
attacked, p, and (ii) the switching mechanisms/topologies that may be compromised.
The upper bound p in the former assumption allows the defender, in the worst case,
to enumerate all possible combinations of Gqkk and H
qk
k . On the other hand, the latter
assumption allows the defender to consider all possible topologies/modes of operations.
Alternatively, the above assumptions on the system and attackers can be viewed as
recommendations or guidelines for system designers/operators to secure their systems
as a preventative attack mitigation measure. For instance, the requirement of strong
detectability allows system designers to determine which actuators or sensors need to
be safeguarded to guarantee resilient estimation.
3.3. Security Problem Statement
With the above characterization, the resilient state estimation problem is identical to
the mode, state and input estimation problem, where the unknown inputs represent
the unknown signal magnitude attacks and each mode/model represents an attack
mode (resulting from the unknown mode attacks and unknown signal attack locations).
The objective of this paper is:
PROBLEM 1. Given a stochastic cyber-physical system described by (1),
(1) develop a resilient estimator that asymptotically recovers unbiased estimates of the
system state and attack signal irrespective of the location or magnitude of attacks on
its actuators and sensors as well as switching mechanism/topology (mode) attacks,
(2) characterize fundamental limitations associated to the inference algorithm we devel-
oped, specifically the maximum number of asymptotically correctable signal attacks
and the maximum number of required models with our multiple-model approach,
(3) study the conditions under which attacks can be detected or noticed (attack detection)
and under which the attack strategy can be identified (attack identification) using the
resilient state estimator we developed, and
(4) design tools for attack mitigation via attack-rejection feedback control.
4. RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION
To achieve resilient state estimation against switching attacks in the presence of
stochastic process and measurement noise signals, we have shown in the previous sec-
tion that the system under switching and false data injection attacks is representable
as a hidden mode, switched linear system with unknown inputs given in (1). Since we
do not know the true model (i.e., the attack strategy corresponding to the true mode
attack and signal location attack), combinations of possible attack strategies need to be
considered, and as such, the multiple-model estimation approach is a natural choice for
solving this problem. Thus, we propose the use of the general purpose multiple-model
1A linear system is strongly detectable if yk = 0 ∀k ≥ 0 implies xk → 0 as k → ∞ for all initial states x0
and input sequences {di}i∈N (see [Yong et al. 2016b, Section 3.2] for necessary and sufficient conditions for
this property).
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algorithm that we previously designed and applied to vehicle collision avoidance [Yong
et al. 2016a] as our resilient state estimation algorithm for solving Problem 1.1.
We will begin with a brief summary of the multiple-model inference algorithm and
its nice properties [Yong et al. 2016a]. Then, we consider Problem 1.2 and characterize
some fundamental limitations to resilient estimation in Section 4.2.
4.1. Resilient State Estimation Algorithm and Properties
4.1.1. Multiple-Model State and Input Filtering Algorithm. The multiple-model (MM) ap-
proach we take is inspired by the multiple-model filtering algorithms for hidden
mode hybrid systems with known inputs (e.g., [Bar-Shalom et al. 2004; Mazor et al.
1998] and references therein), that have been widely applied for target tracking. Our
multiple-model framework (see Figure 3) consists of the parallel implementation of a
bank of input and state filters [Yong et al. 2016b] with each model corresponding to
a system mode (i.e., of mode-matched filters that simultaneously estimate states and
unknown inputs from sensor measurements and known inputs for each mode). The
objective of the MM approach is then to decide which model/mode is the best represen-
tation of the current system mode as well as to estimate the state and unknown input
of the system based on this decision.
In this subsection, we provide an abbreviated review of the multiple-model ap-
proach for simultaneous mode, state and unknown input estimation given in [Yong
et al. 2016a]. Two variants of the multiple-model inference algorithm—static and
dynamic—were proposed in that work. The latter provides a possibility of incorporat-
ing prior knowledge about the switching strategy of the attack. However, we assume
no such knowledge about the malicious agent; thus we consider only the static variant
(cf. Algorithm 2 and Figure 4), which consists of: (i) a bank of mode-matched filters,
and (ii) a likelihood-based approach for computing model probability.
Fig. 3: Multiple-model framework for hidden mode, input and state estimation. Each
model consists of a mode-matched filter that uses known inputs u and outputs y to
estimate states xˆ and unknown inputs dˆ, in addition to generalized innovations ν that
in turn, determine the most probable mode qˆ = arg maxj∈{1,...,N} µj .
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Fig. 4: Illustration of the exchange of signals/information between components of a
static multiple-model estimator with two mode-matched input and state filters.
Mode-Matched Filters. The bank of filters is comprised of N simultaneous state
and input filters, one for each mode, based on the optimal recursive filter developed in
[Yong et al. 2016b] (superscript qk omitted to increase readability; cf. Algorithm 1).
Unknown Input Estimation:
dˆ1,k = M1,k(z1,k − C1,kxˆk|k −D1,kuk),
dˆ2,k−1 = M2,k(z2,k − C2,kxˆk|k−1 −D2,kuk),
dˆk−1 = V1,k−1dˆ1,k−1 + V2,k−1dˆ2,k−1,
(2)
Time Update:
xˆk|k−1 = Ak−1xˆk−1|k−1 +Bk−1uk−1 +G1,k−1dˆ1,k−1,
xˆ?k|k = xˆk|k−1 +G2,k−1dˆ2,k−1,
(3)
Measurement Update:
xˆk|k = xˆ?k|k + L˜k(z2,k − C2,kxˆ?k|k −D2,kuk), (4)
where xˆk−1|k−1, dˆ1,k−1, dˆ2,k−1 and dˆk−1 denote the optimal estimates of xk−1, d1,k−1,
d2,k−1 and dk−1. The remaining notations are best understood in the context of the
system transformation described in Appendix A.1. Due to space constraints, the filter
derivation as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for filter stability and opti-
mality are omitted; the reader is referred to [Yong et al. 2016b] for details.
Mode Probability Computation. To compute the probability of each mode, the
multiple-model approach exploits the whiteness property [Yong et al. 2016a, Theorem
1] of the generalized innovation sequence, νk, defined as
νk , Γ˜k(z2,k − C2,kxˆ?k|k −D2,kuk), (5)
i.e., νk ∼ N (0, Sk) (a multivariate normal distribution) with covariance Sk , E[νkν>k ] =
Γ˜kR˜
?
2,kΓ˜
>
k and where Γ˜k is chosen such that Sk is invertible and R˜
?
2,k is given in Algo-
rithm 1. In the context of resilient estimation, the generalized innovation represents
the residual signal where the effects of false data injection attacks have been removed.
Then, using this “attack-free” generalized innovation, we define the likelihood function
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for each mode q at time k conditioned on all prior measurements Zk−1:
L(qk|z2,k) , N (νqkk ; 0, Sqkk )=
exp(− 12νqk >k (Sqkk )−1νqkk )√|2piSqkk | . (6)
Then, using Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability µjk for each mode j is recursively
computed from the prior probability µjk−1 using
µjk = P (qk = j|z1,k, z2,k, Zk−1) =
N (νjk; 0, Sjk)µjk−1∑N
i=1N (νik; 0, Sik)µjk−1
. (7)
Note that a heuristic lower bound on all mode probabilities is imposed such that the
modes are kept alive in case of a switch in the attacker’s strategy. Finally, based on the
posterior mode probabilities, the most likely mode at each time k, qˆk, and the associated
state and input estimates and covariances, xˆk|k, dˆk, P xk|k and P
d
k , are determined:
qˆk = j
∗ = arg maxj∈{1,...,N} µ
j
k, xˆk|k = xˆ
j∗
k|k, dˆk = dˆ
j∗
k , P
x
k|k = P
x,j∗
k|k , P
d
k = P
d,j∗
k . (8)
4.1.2. Properties of the Resilient State Estimator. Our previous work [Yong et al. 2016a]
shows that the resilient state estimator has nice asymptotic properties, namely (i)
mean consistency, i.e., the geometric mean of the mode probability for the true model
∗ ∈ Q asymptotically converges to 1 for all initial mode probabilities [Yong et al. 2016a,
Theorem 8] and (ii) asymptotic optimality, i.e., the state and input estimates in (8)
converge on average to optimal state and input estimates in the minimum variance
unbiased sense [Yong et al. 2016a, Corollary 13].
4.2. Fundamental Limitations of Attack-Resilient Estimation
Next, we consider Problem 1.2 and characterize fundamental limitations of the attack-
resilient estimation problem and of our multiple mode filtering approach, which con-
stitutes one of the main results in this paper. First, assuming for the moment that
there is only one mode of operation (no switching attacks), we will upper bound the
number of asymptotically correctable signal attacks/errors (i.e., signal attacks whose
effects can be asymptotically negated or cancelled such that unbiased state estimates
are still available). Then, we provide the maximum number of models that is required
by our multiple-model approach to obtain resilient estimates despite attacks.
4.2.1. Number of Asymptotically Correctable Signal Attacks. More formally, we introduce the
following definition for only data injection attacks, which in itself is an interesting
research problem in the CPS security community.
Definition 4.1 (Asymptotically/Exponentially Correctable Signal Attacks). We say
that p actuators and sensors signal attacks are asymptotically/exponentially cor-
rectable, if for any initial state x0 ∈ Rn and signal attack sequence {dj}j∈N in Rp,
we have an estimator such that the estimate bias asymptotically/exponentially tends
to zero, i.e., E[xˆk − xk]→ 0 (and E[dˆk−1 − dk−1]→ 0) as k →∞.
Remark 4.2. Note the distinction in the definitions of asymptotically/exponentially
correctable signal attacks in Definition 4.1 and of correctable signal attacks in [Fawzi
et al. 2014, Definition 1]. Their definition implies finite-time estimation and is related
to strong observability [Fawzi et al. 2014]. Due to the new challenges of further con-
sidering stochastic noise signals and mode switching, we adopt the weaker notion of
asymptotic estimation, which only requires a ‘weaker’ condition of strong detectability
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(implied by strong observability [Yong et al. 2016b]). This is mainly for the sake of the-
oretical analysis. Simulation results demonstrate that our algorithm has practically
finite-time convergence.
To derive an estimation-theoretic upper bound on the maximum number of signal
attacks that can be asymptotically corrected, we assume that the true model or mode
(qk = ∗) is known. Thus, the resilient state estimation problem is identical to the state
and input estimation problem in [Yong et al. 2016b], where the unknown inputs repre-
sent the attacks on the actuator and sensor signals. It has been shown in [Yong et al.
2016b] that unbiased states (and also unknown inputs) can be obtained asymptoti-
cally (exponentially) only if the system is strongly detectable (cf. [Yong et al. 2016b]
for more details, e.g. regarding filter stability and existence). With this in mind, the
upper bound on the maximum number of signal attacks that can be asymptotically
(exponentially) corrected is given as follows:
ALGORITHM 1: OPT-FILTER finds the optimal state and input estimates for mode qk
Input: qk, xˆqkk−1|k−1, dˆ
qk
1,k−1, P
x,qk
k−1|k−1, P
xd,qk
1,k−1, P
d,qk
1,k−1 [superscript qk omitted in the following]
. Estimation of d2,k−1 and dk−1
Aˆk−1 = Ak−1 −G1,k−1M1,k−1C1,k−1;
Qˆk−1 = G1,k−1M1,k−1R1,k−1M>1,k−1G
>
1,k−1 +Qk−1;
P˜k = Aˆk−1P xk−1|k−1Aˆ
>
k−1 + Qˆk−1;
R˜2,k = C2,kP˜kC
>
2,k +R2,k;
P d2,k−1 = (G
>
2,k−1C
>
2,kR˜
−1
2,kC2,kG2,k−1)
−1;
M2,k = P
d
2,k−1G
>
2,k−1C
>
2,kR˜
−1
2,k;
xˆk|k−1 = Ak−1xˆk−1|k−1 +Bk−1uk−1 +G1,k−1dˆ1,k−1;
dˆ2,k−1 = M2,k(z2,k − C2,kxˆk|k−1 −D2,kuk);
dˆk−1 = V1,k−1dˆ1,k−1 + V2,k−1dˆ2,k−1;
P d12,k−1 = M1,k−1C1,k−1P
x
k−1|k−1A
>
k−1C
>
2,kM
>
2,k − P d1,k−1G>1,k−1C>2,kM>2,k;
P dk−1 = Vk−1
[
P d1,k−1 P
d
12,k−1
P d>12,k−1 P
d
2,k−1
]
V >k−1;
. Time update
xˆ?k|k = xˆk|k−1 +G2,k−1dˆ2,k−1;
P ?xk|k = G2,k−1M2,kR2,kM
>
2,kG
>
2,k + (I −G2,k−1M2,kC2,k)P˜k(I −G2,k−1M2,kC2,k)>;
R˜?2,k = C2,kP
?x
k|kC
>
2,k +R2,k − C2,kG2,k−1M2,kR2,k −R2,kM>2,kG>2,k−1C2,k;
. Measurement update
P˘k = P
?x
k|kC
>
2,k −G2,k−1M2,kR2,k;
L˜k = P˘kR˜
?†
2,k;
xˆk|k = xˆ
?
k|k + L˜k(z2,k − C2,kxˆ?k|k −D2,kuk);
P xk|k = L˜kR
?
2,kL˜
>
k − L˜kP˘>k − P˘kL˜>k ;
. Estimation of d1,k
R˜1,k = C1,kP
x
k|kC
>
1,k +R1,k;
M1,k = Σ
−1
k ;
P d1,k = M1,kR˜1,kM1,k;
dˆ1,k = M1,k(z1,k − C1,kxˆk|k −D1,kuk);
return R˜?,qk2,k , xˆ
?,qk
k|k
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ALGORITHM 2: RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATOR (STATIC-MM-ESTIMATOR) finds resilient
state estimates corresponding to most likely mode
Input: ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}: xˆj0|0; µj0;
dˆj1,0 = (Σ
j
0)
−1(zj1,0 − Cj1,0xˆj0|0 −Dj1,0u0); P d,j1,0 = (Σj0)−1(Cj1,0P x,j0|0 Cj>1,0 +Rj1,0)(Σj0)−1;
for k = 1 to N do
for j = 1 to N do
. Mode-Matched Filtering
Run OPT-FILTER(j,xˆjk−1|k−1, dˆ
j
1,k−1, P
x,j
k−1|k−1, P
d,j
1,k−1);
νjk , z
j
2,k − Cj2,kxˆ?,jk|k −Dj2,kuk;
L(j|zj2,k) = 1
(2pi)
p
j
R˜
/2|R˜j,?
2,k
|1/2+
exp
(
− ν
j>
k
R˜
j,?†
2,k
ν
j
k
2
)
;
end
for j = 1 to N do
. Mode Probability Update (small  > 0)
µjk = max{L(j|zj2,k)µjk−1, };
end
for j = 1 to N do
. Mode Probability Update (normalization)
µjk =
µ
j
k∑N
`=1
µ`
k
;
. Output
Compute (8);
end
end
return xˆk|k, P xk|k
THEOREM 4.3 (MAXIMUM CORRECTABLE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS). The max-
imum number of asymptotically (exponentially fast) correctable actuators and sensors
signal attacks, p∗, for system (1) is equal to the number of sensors, l, i.e., p∗ ≤ l and the
upper bound is achievable.
PROOF. A necessary and sufficient condition for strong detectability (with the true
model qk = ∗) is given in [Yong et al. 2016b] as
rk
[
zI −A∗ −G∗
C∗ H∗
]
= n+ p∗, ∀z ∈ C, |z| ≥ 1. (9)
Since the above system matrix has only n + l rows, it follows that its rank is at most
n + l. Thus, from the necessary condition for (9), we obtain n + p∗ ≤ n + l ⇒ p∗ ≤ l.
We show that the upper bound is achievable using the example of the discrete-time
equivalent model (with time step ∆t = 0.1s) of the smart grid case study in [Liu et al.
2013], where in both circuit breaker modes, A =
[
0.9520 0.0936
−0.9358 0.8584
]
and G =
[
0
0
]
. If
the first state is measured but compromised (e.g., C = [1 0] and H = 1 ⇒ p∗ = l), it
can be verified that the system is strongly detectable, i.e., with two invariant zeros at
{0.9945 ± 0.0311j} that are strictly in the unit circle in the complex plane. Similarly,
it can be verified that the unstable system with matrices A =
[
1.5 1
0 0.1
]
, G =
[
1 0
0 0
]
,
C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and H =
[
0 0
0 1
]
(i.e., with p∗ = l) has an invariant zero at {0.1} and is hence
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strongly detectable. Thus, in both cases, the optimal filter in [Yong et al. 2016b] can be
applied and unbiased state estimates can be asymptotically achieved when p∗ = l.
The theorem above implies that for each mode of operation that results from switch-
ing attacks, the total number of vulnerable actuators and sensors must not exceed
the number of measurements. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that the necessity of
strong detectability can serve as a guide to determine which actuators or sensors need
to be safeguarded to guarantee resilient estimation, for preventative attack mitigation.
Since strong detectability is a system property that is independent of the filter design,
the necessity of this property can be viewed as a fundamental limitation for resilient
estimation, i.e., the ability to asymptotically/exponentially obtain unbiased estimates.
4.2.2. Number of Required Models for Estimation Resilience. Then, in a similar spirit as the
attack set identification approach of [Weimer et al. 2012; Pasqualetti et al. 2013] in
which a bank of deterministic residuals are computed to determine the true attack
set (but not the magnitude of the attacks), we consider a bank of filters to find the
most probable model/mode. We now characterize the maximum number of models N∗
that need to be considered with the multiple-model approach in Section 4.1 (which is
independent of the size of the system, e.g., the number of buses in a power system):
THEOREM 4.4 (MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MODELS/MODES). Suppose there are ta
actuators and ts sensors, and at most p ≤ l of these signals are attacked. Suppose
also that there are tm possible attack modes (mode attack). Then, the combinatorial
number of all possible models, and hence the maximum number of models that need to
be considered with the multiple-model approach, is
N∗ = tm
(
ta + ts
p
)
= tm
(
ta + ts
ta + ts − p
)
.
PROOF. It is sufficient to consider only models corresponding to the maximum num-
ber of attacks p. All models with strictly less than p attacks are contained in this set
of models with the attack vectors having some identically zero elements for which our
estimation algorithm is still applicable. Thus, we only need to consider combinations
of p attacks among ta + ts sensors and actuators for each of the tm attack modes of
operation/topologies. Note that this number is the maximum because resilience may
be achievable with less models: For instance, when tm = 1, ta = 0 and ts = 2 = l, p = 1,
A =
[
0.1 1
0 0.2
]
and C = I2, we have N∗ = 2, but it can be verified that with G = 02×2
and H = I2 (only one model, i.e., 1 = N < N∗), the system is strongly detectable.
Remark 4.5. If N > 1, the multiple-model approach requires that the number of
attacks is strictly less than the number of sensor measurements, i.e., p < l. Otherwise,
the generalized innovation (5) is empty and we have no means of selecting the ‘best’
model, i.e., of computing mode probabilities.
We now discuss how the availability of additional knowledge about the data injection
attack strategies may influence the number of models that needs to be considered
in relation to the number of models N∗ in Theorem 4.4 when such knowledge is not
available. Suppose we have additional knowledge that there are at most na ≤ ta and
ns ≤ ts attacks on the actuators and sensors, respectively, with a total of p attacks
(where p ≤ l and p ≤ na + ns), then the maximum number of models that are required,
N∗ = tm
min{na,p}∑
i=0
(
ta
i
)(
ts
min{p− i, ns}
)
,
14 S.Z. Yong et al.
is less than the number required in combinatorial case in Theorem 4.4.
On the other hand, the knowledge that less actuators or sensors are vulnerable may
actually increase the number of models, as shown in the following example with tm = 1
(one mode of operation), na = 0 (no attacks on actuators), A =
[
0.1 1
0 1.2
]
and C = I.
Suppose only one of the two sensors is vulnerable, ns = p = 1 < l = 2, then we have
to consider 2 models with G =
[
0
0
]
, H1 =
[
1
0
]
and H2 =
[
0
1
]
. On the other hand, if
both sensors are vulnerable ns = p = 2, then only one model is required with G = 0
and H = I. Note, however, that the latter case is not strongly detectable with zeros at
{0.1, 1.2}, thus this system violates the necessary condition in [Yong et al. 2016b] for
obtaining resilient estimates; but both systems in the former case can be verified to be
strongly detectable.
5. ATTACK DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we consider Problem 1.3 and study the consequence of the asymptotic
properties of the resilient state estimation algorithm (static MM filter) in Section 4.1.2
on attack detection and identification.
First, note that the resilient state estimation algorithm we presented in the previ-
ous section is oblivious to whether the switching and false data injection attacks on
the system are strategic. Nonetheless, we would like to understand how strategic at-
tacks can be detected or identified by our algorithm. Specifically, we consider strategic
attackers whose goal is to choose data injection signals dk and the true mode ∗ ∈ Q
in order to mislead the system operator/defender into believing that the mode of op-
eration is q ∈ Q, q 6= ∗. If such an attack action cannot be reconstructed/identified by
the system operated, then we refer to this attack as unidentifiable. If, in addition, the
attack is not noticeable, then this attack is undetectable, formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Switching and Data Injection Attack Detection). A switching and
data injection attack is detected if the true mode ∗ ∈ Q (chosen by attacker) has
the maximum mean probability when using the resilient state estimation algorithm
in Algorithm 2 or is not distinguishable from another mode q ∈ Q, q 6= ∗ (chosen by
defender) on average.
Definition 5.2 (Switching and Data Injection Attack Identification). A switching
and data injection attack strategy is identified if the attack is detected and in addi-
tion, the true mode ∗ ∈ Q is uniquely determined on average, which reveals the chosen
mode attack and signal attack location, and asymptotically unbiased estimates of at-
tack signals dk can be obtained, i.e., the signal magnitude attack is reliably estimated.
From the above definitions, it is clear that if an attack is undetectable, then it will
also be unidentifiable. On the flip side, if an attack is identifiable, then it is detectable.
Note, however, that attack detection or identification is not needed for obtaining re-
silient state estimates. For instance, in the trivial case that there are no attacks dk = 0
for all k, the state estimates of all models would perform equally well. This means that
the attacks need not be detected or identified for obtaining resilient estimates.
5.1. Attack Detection
Fortunately, our resilient state estimation algorithm in Algorithm 2 guarantees that
an attack will always be detected by Definition 5.1.
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THEOREM 5.3 (ATTACK DETECTION). The resilient state estimation algorithm in
Algorithm 2 (with ratios of prior being identically 1) guarantees that switching and
data injection attacks are always detectable.
PROOF. Since the Kullback Leibler divergence D(f∗` ‖fq` ) is greater than or equal to
0 with equality if and only if f∗` = f
q
` ([Kullback and Leibler 1951, Lemma 3.1]), with
j = ∗ ∈ Q as the true model and i ∈ Q, i 6= ∗, the summand in the exponent of the
ratio of geometric means whose expression is given in [Yong et al. 2016a, Lemma 14]
is always non-negative, i.e., D(f∗` ‖f i`) −D(f∗` ‖f∗` ) = D(f∗` ‖f i`) ≥ 0. In other words, the
ratio of the true model mean probability to the model mean probabilities of any other
mode (i ∈ Q, i 6= ∗) cannot decrease and can at best remain the same as the ratio of
their priors which is 1 by assumption. Thus, either the true model is identified or both
modes are indistinguishable and an alarm can be raised for attack detection.
5.2. Attack Identification
On the other hand, even when a combined switching and false data injection attack is
detectable, it may not be identifiable. In order to identify an attack strategy and action,
the mean consistency property of our estimation algorithm is a sufficient condition,
which follows directly by Definition 5.2.
THEOREM 5.4 (ATTACK IDENTIFICATION). Suppose mean consistency, i.e., [Yong
et al. 2016a, Theorem 8] holds (and hence [Yong et al. 2016a, Corollary 13] also holds).
Then, the switching and data injection attack strategy can be identified using the re-
silient state estimation algorithm in Algorithm 2.
On the other hand, if the estimator is not mean consistent but the true mode is in
the set of models, then there must exist some models with generalized innovations
that have identical probability distributions as the generalized innovation of the true
model (since their KL-divergences are identically zero), and that are hence Gaussian
white sequences [Yong et al. 2016a]. In other words, in order to remain unidentifiable
for some mode q ∈ Q, an attacker seeks to choose another ‘true’ mode ∗ ∈ Q, ∗ 6= q
and the attack signal dk such that the distributions of their generalized innovations
ν∗k and ν
q|∗
k are identical, i.e., Gaussian white sequences with E[ν
q|∗
k ] = E[ν∗k ] = 0 and
E[νq|∗k ν
q|∗>
k ] = E[ν∗kν∗>k ] = S∗k , Γ˜∗kR˜
∗,?
2,kΓ˜
∗>
k for all k. Using this observation, we now
investigate some conditions under which attackers can be unidentifiable, as well as
some other conditions under which the defenders/system operators can guarantee that
the attacks are identifiable.
5.2.1. A sufficient condition for unidentifiable attacks. Given that mean consistency guaran-
tees that an attack is identifiable, the goal of an attacker would be to ensure that mean
consistency does not hold by a strategic choice of data injection signals dk and the true
mode ∗ ∈ Q in order to mislead the system operator/defender into believing that the
mode of operation is q ∈ Q, q 6= ∗. The following is a sufficient condition for an attacker
to synthesize an unidentifiable switching and data injection attack.
THEOREM 5.5 (UNIDENTIFIABLE ATTACK). Suppose Γ˜qkT
q
2,kH
∗
k has linearly inde-
pendent rows and there exists ∗ 6= q ∈ Q such that
Dsk , (Γ˜qkT q2,kH∗k)†(S∗k − Γ˜qkT q2,k(E[µq|∗k µq|∗>k ] +Rk)(Γ˜qkT q2,k)>))(Γ˜qkT q2,kH∗k)†> (10)
is positive definite ( 0) for all k. Moreover, we assume that µ∗0 = µq0. Then, the attack is
unidentifiable if the attacker chooses this mode ∗ 6= q as well as the attack signal dk as
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a Gaussian sequence
dk ∼ N (ddk,Dsk), ∀k (11)
with Dsk defined in (10) and ddk is given by
ddk , E[dk] = −(Γ˜qkT q2,kH∗k)†Γ˜qkT q2,k(C∗kE[xk]− Cqk xˆ?,qk|k + (D∗k −Dqk)E[uk])
= −(Γ˜qkT q2,kH∗k)†Γ˜qkT q2,k(C∗k xˆ∗k|k − Cqk xˆ?,qk|k + (D∗k −Dqk)E[uk]), ∀k.
(12)
PROOF. First, we compute what the generalized innovation for q ∈ Qwould be when
the attacker chooses ∗ as the true mode:
ν
q|∗
k = Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,k(yk − Cqk xˆ?,qk|k −Dqkuk) = Γ˜qkT q2,k(µq|∗k +H∗k(dk − E[dk]) + vk), (13)
where µq|∗k , C∗kxk − Cqk xˆ?,qk|k + (D∗k − Dqk)uk + H∗kddk, whose first and second moments,
E[µq|∗k ] and E[µ
q|∗
k µ
q|∗>
k ], are assumed to be known to the attacker, while T
q
2,k is the
transformation matrix for mode q as described in detail in [Yong et al. 2016b].
Substituting (11) into (13) and computing its first and second moments using (10)
and (12), we obtain
E[νq|∗k ] = Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,kE[µ
q|∗
k ] = 0,
E[νq|∗k ν
q|∗>
k ] = Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,k(E[µ
q|∗
k µ
q|∗>
k ] +H
∗
kDskH∗>k +Rk)(Γ˜qkT q2,k)> = S∗k .
Since we assumed that µ∗0 = µ
q
0, we observe that the ratio of the geometric means of
model probabilities given in [Yong et al. 2016a, Lemma 14] equals 1. In other words,
the attacked system cannot be distinguished from one under normal operation, i.e.,
the attack is unidentifiable by Definition 5.2.
From the above theorem, we observe that the unidentifiable attack strategy relies
on two factors. First, the system has vulnerabilities that can be exploited, if the suffi-
cient conditions of the theorem are allowed to hold. Thus, as a system designer, these
conditions serve as a guide for securing the system. Secondly, the attacker needs com-
putational capability and system knowledge that are comparable to that of the system
operator/defender.
5.2.2. A sufficient condition for resilient state estimation. From the perspective of the system
designer/operator/defender, the main objective of resilient state estimation is to obtain
unbiased state estimates in order to preserve the integrity and functionality of the
system despite attacks. Attack identification is a secondary goal and is only optional.
First and foremost, the system vulnerabilities need to be eliminated. Thus, the sys-
tem needs to be strongly detectable for all modes q ∈ Q, as discussed in Section 3.2.
Next, since Theorem 5.5 presents yet another system vulnerability, a sufficient condi-
tion is needed such that this theorem does not hold.
LEMMA 5.6. Theorem 5.5 does not hold if Hqk = Hk for all q ∈ Q.
PROOF. Since Hqk = Hk for all q ∈ Q, T q2,k = T ∗2,k and thus, T q2,kH∗k = T ∗2,kH∗k = 0
and Γ˜qkT
q
2,kH
∗
k = 0. Hence, Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,kH
∗
k = 0 cannot have linearly independent rows, as
assumed in Theorem 5.5.
In addition to requiring Hqk = Hk for all q ∈ Q, without loss of generality and for
simplicity, we also assume that Dqk = D
∗
k for all q ∈ Q. Since Theorem 5.5 presents
only sufficient conditions, a strategic attacker may somehow still be able to make the
distributions of the generalized innovations ν∗k and ν
q|∗
k identical. Thus, even in this
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case where Hqk = Hk and D
q
k = Dk for all q ∈ Q, it is interesting to investigate fur-
ther sufficient conditions for the system defender to ensure that the main objective of
resilient state estimation is still achieved.
THEOREM 5.7 (RESILIENCE GUARANTEE). Suppose Hqk = Hk and D
q
k = Dk for all
q ∈ Q. Moreover, for all q, q′ ∈ Q, if there exists T such that for all k ≥ T and the
following holds
(i) rank
[
Γ˜qkT
q
2,kC
q′
k Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,kC
q
k
]
= 2n, if Cqk 6= Cq
′
k ,
(ii) rank(Γ˜qkT
q
2,kC
q′
k ) = rank(Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,kC
q
k) = n, if C
q
k = C
q′
k ,
then the state estimates obtained using Algorithm 2 are guaranteed to be resilient (i.e.,
asymptotically unbiased).
PROOF. These sufficient conditions are derived by making sure that E[νq|∗k ] 6=
E[ν∗k ] = 0 such that [Yong et al. 2016a, Theorem 8] does not hold. First, by the as-
sumptions of this theorem, (13) simplifies to
ν
q|∗
k = Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,k(C
∗
kxk − Cqk xˆ?,qk|k + vk). (14)
In Case (i), i.e., when Cqk 6= C∗k , we have E[νq|∗k ] =
[
Γ˜qkT
q
2,kC
∗
k Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,kC
q
k
] [ E[xk]
−E[xˆ?,qk|k]
]
.
Hence, since the rank condition holds, E[νq|∗k ] 6= 0 unless
[
E[xk]
−E[xˆ?,qk|k]
]
= 0, in which case
we have an unbiased (and thus resilient) estimate E[xˆ?,qk|k] = E[xk] = 0.
In Case (ii), i.e., when Cqk = C
∗
k , we have E[ν
q|∗
k ] = Γ˜
q
kT
q
2,kC
q
kE[xk − xˆ?,qk|k]. By the
rank assumption, E[νq|∗k ] 6= 0 unless E[xk − xˆ?,qk|k] = 0, in which case we again have an
unbiased (and thus resilient) estimate E[xˆ?,qk|k] = E[xk].
Note that Theorem 5.7 only guarantees that the state estimates are unbiased, but
the true mode cannot be uniquely distinguished and the attack signal cannot be esti-
mated. Hence, the conditions in Theorem 5.7 are not sufficient for attack identification.
6. ATTACK MITIGATION
We now turn to the next step beyond attack detection and identification, and investi-
gate how we can mitigate the effects of attacks (Problem 1.4). Specifically, we study the
problem of rejecting/canceling data injection attacks assuming that the attack mode
can be identified (thus, the superscript q is omitted throughout this section), while
using the resilient state estimates for feedback stabilization, in the sense of guaran-
teeing the boundedness of the expected states for bounded attack signals. To this end,
we consider a linear state feedback controller with attack/disturbance rejection terms,
where the true state and unknown input are replaced by their estimated values:
uk = −Kckxˆk|k − J1,kdˆ1,k − J2,kdˆ2,k−1, (15)
where Kck is the state feedback gain, while J1,k and J2,k are the attack/disturbance
rejection gains. Note that we have used a delayed estimate of d2,k−1 given in (2), which
is the only estimate we can obtain in light of [Yong et al. 2016b, Equation (6)].
THEOREM 6.1 (ATTACK-MITIGATING AND STABILIZING CONTROLLER). Suppose
the system is controllable in the true mode q ∈ Q (known or detected), and the expected
values of attack signals E[d2,k] and their rates of variation ‖E[d2,k−d2,k−1]‖ are bounded
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for all k, i.e., ‖E[d2,k]‖ ≤ dB2 and ‖E[d2,k − d2,k−1]‖ ≤ δdB2 with min{dB2 , δdB2 } <∞. Then,
a feedback controller that mitigates the effects of data injection attacks and guarantees
the boundedness of the expected system states is given by
uk = −Kckxˆk|k − [J1,k J2,k] J˜−1k
[
M1,k(z1,k − C1,kxˆk|k)
M2,k(z2,k − C2,kxˆk|k−1)
]
, (16)
where Kck is any state feedback gain such that Ak − BkKck is stable and the at-
tack/disturbance rejection gain J1,k is chosen to minimize γ1 , ‖G1,k−BkJ1,k‖2, which
can be solved with a semidefinite program2 (with i = 1) as follows:
minimize γi
subject to
[
γiI Gi,k −BkJi,k
(Gi,k −BkJi,k)> γiI
]
 0, (17)
while J2,k is chosen as 0 if δdB2 > dB2 , and otherwise, to minimize γ2 , ‖G2,k −
BkJ2,k‖2 by solving the semidefinite program (17) with i = 2. It is assumed that
J˜k ,
[
I −M1,kD1,kJ1,k −M1,kD1,kJ2,k
−M2,kD2,kJ1,k I −M2,kD2,kJ2,k
]
is invertible.
To prove Theorem 6.1, we first show that there exists a separation principle for
linear discrete-time stochastic systems with unknown inputs, i.e., when the true mode
is known, which allows us to choose the state feedback gain Kck and attack/disturbance
rejection gains J1,k and J2,k independently.
LEMMA 6.2. (Separation Principle) The state feedback controller gainKck in (15) can
be designed independently of the state and input estimator gains Lk, M1,k and M2,k in
Algorithm 1, as well as the disturbance rejection gains J1,k and J2,k.
PROOF. Using the control law (15) and the filter equations in (2), (3) and (4), it can
be verified that the system states and estimator error dynamics are given by[
xk+1
x˜k+1|k+1
]
=
Ak −BkKck Bk(Kck−J1,kM1,kC1,k−J2,kM2,kC2,k+1(Ak+G1,kM1,kC1,k))
0 (I − L˜k+1C2,k)Ak
[ xk
x˜k|k
]
+
[
G1,k −BkJ1,k G2,k −BkJ2,k
0 0
] [
d1,k
d2,k
]
+
[
BkJ2,k
0
]
(d2,k − dˆ2,k−1) (18)
+

I −BkJ2,k
M2,k+1C2,k+1
−BkJ1,kM1,k +BkJ2,k
M2,k+1C2,k+1G1,kM1,k
−BkJ2,kM2,k+1
(I − L˜k+1C2,k+1)
(I −G2,kM2,k+1
C2,k+1)
−(I − L˜k+1C2,k+1)
(I −G2,kM2,k+1C2,k+1)
G1,kM1,k
−(I − L˜k+1C2,k+1)
G2,kM2,k+1 − L˜k+1
wk,
where wk ,
[
w>k v
>
1,k v
>
2,k+1
]> has zero mean and Ak , (I − G2,k−1M2,kC2,k)(Ak −
G1,kM1,kC1,k). Since the state matrix has a block diagonal structure, the eigenvalues
of the controller and estimator are independent of each other.
Armed with the above lemma, we now show how the state feedback and attack re-
jection gains can be independently chosen.
2Semidefinite programs are convex optimization problems for which software packages, e.g. CVX [CVX Re-
search, Inc. 2012; Grant and Boyd 2008], are available.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1. By Lemma 6.2, the state feedback gain, Kck, can be in-
dependently designed with no effect on the stability of the resilient state estimator
and independent of the choice of the disturbance rejection gains J1,k and J2,k. In other
words, Kck can be chosen as any state feedback gain (e.g., with Linear Quadratic Regu-
lator (LQR) or pole placement) such that Ak−BkKck is stable, thus the expected system
states is bounded since the expected values of the attack signals and their variation
rates are bounded by assumption.
On the other hand, J1 and J2 are chosen such that the effect of injected attack signal
dk on the closed loop system is minimized/reduced. Since d1,k affects the closed loop
dynamics through the matrix G1,k − BkJ1,k, we choose J1,k such that the induced 2-
norm of G1,k−BkJ1,k is minimized, which can be obtained by the semidefinite program
(17) with i = 1. Similarly, J2,k can be chosen to minimize the induced 2-norm of G2,k −
BkJ2,k using the semidefinite program (17) with i = 2. However, we have an additional
d2,k − dˆ2,k−1 in the closed loop dynamics (18), which disappears if J2,k = 0. Thus, if we
assume that E[d2,k] is bounded for all k, i.e., ‖E[d2,k]‖ ≤ dB2 , and its rate of variation is
bounded, i.e., ‖E[d2,k − d2,k−1]‖ ≤ δdB2 is bounded for all k, one would choose J2,k as 0
or use (17) with i = 2, depending on the lower of the two bounds, dB2 or δdB2 .
In addition, J1,k and J2,k must also be chosen so that u, dˆ1,k and dˆ2,k−1 can be
uniquely determined since dˆ1,k and dˆ2,k−1 become implicit equations. Thus, the choices
of J1,k and J2,k must also be such that J˜k is invertible. The explicit expressions for dˆ1,k
and dˆ2,k−1 (to be substituted into Algorithm 1) is then[
dˆ1,k
dˆ2,k−1
]
= J˜−1k
[
M1,k(z1,k − C1,kxˆk|k)
M2,k(z2,k − C2,kxˆk|k−1)
]
. (19)
Substituting (19) back into (15), we obtain the feedback controller in (16).
Note that if the system in (1) for each qk ∈ Q fulfills a matching condition for d1,k
3, i.e., ∃J1,k such that BkJ1,kd1,k = G1,kd1,k, the above minimization procedure will
exactly cancel out the attack signal d1,k.
7. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
7.1. Benchmark System (Signal Magnitude & Location Attacks)
In this example, we consider the resilient state estimation problem for a system (mod-
ified from [Yong et al. 2016b]) that has been used as a benchmark for many state and
input filters, with only one mode of operation (tm = 1) and with possible attacks on the
actuator and 4 of the 5 sensors (ta = 1, ts = 4):
A=

0.5 2 0 0 0
0 0.2 1 0 1
0 0 0.3 0 1
0 0 0 0.7 1
0 0 0 0 0.1
; B=G=

1
0.1
0.1
1
0
; C=

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 −0.1 0 0
0 0 1 −0.5 0.2
0 0 0 1 0
0 0.25 0 0 1
;
H=

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
; Q=10−4

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0.5 0 0
0 0.5 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
; R=10−4

1 0 0 0.5 0
0 1 0 0 0.3
0 0 1 0 0
0.5 0 0 1 0
0 0.3 0 0 1
.
3The matching condition assumption is common for disturbance rejection in the sliding mode and adaptive
control literature.
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Fig. 5: Mode probabilities for Example 7.1.
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Fig. 6: State and attack magnitude estimates in Example 7.1.
The known input uk is 2 for 100 ≤ k ≤ 300, −2 for 500 ≤ k ≤ 700 and 0 otherwise,
whereas the unknown inputs are as depicted in Figure 6. We also assume that there
are at most p = 4 attacks with no constraints on na and ns; as a result, we have to
consider N = 1 · (54) = 5 models.
Due to space limitation, we only provide simulation results for the case when the sig-
nal attack locations are switched from q = 3 (attack on actuator and sensors 1,3,4) to
q = 2 (attack on actuator and sensors 1,2,4) at time t = 500s. From Figure 5, we observe
that the mode probabilities converge to their true values. Figure 6 shows the estimates
of states as well as the unknown attack signal magnitudes. The state estimates, which
are our main concern, are seen to be good even before the mode probabilities converge,
while the unknown attack signals are also reasonably well estimated, with the excep-
tion of little jumps in its estimates during the switch in attack locations at t = 500s.
Similar results (not shown) are obtained for all other attack modes, q = 1 (attack on
actuator and sensors 1,2,3), q = 4 (attack on actuator and sensors 2,3,4) and q = 5
(attack on sensors 1,2,3,4).
Switching and Data Injection Attacks on Stochastic Cyber-Physical Systems 21
7.2. IEEE 68-Bus Test System (Mode & Signal Magnitude Attacks)
Next, we apply our approach to the IEEE 68-bus test system shown in Figure 7 to
empirically illustrate that the proposed algorithm can scale to large systems.
A power network is generally represented by undirected graph (V, E) with the set of
buses V , {1, , N} and the set of transmission/tie lines E ⊆ V × V. Each bus is either
a generator bus i ∈ G, or a load bus i ∈ L. The set of neighboring buses of i ∈ V is
denoted as Si , {j ∈ V \ {i}|(i, j) ∈ E}. For the IEEE 68-bus test system, there are
16 generator buses and 52 load buses (i.e., |G| = 16, |L| = 52 and |V| = 68). Each bus,
i ∈ V, is described by (as in [Wood et al. 2013, Chap. 10]):
θ˙i(t) = ωi(t),
ω˙i(t) = − 1mi [Diωi(t) +
∑
j∈Si P
ij
tie(t)− (PMi(t) + da,i(t)) + PLi(t) + wi(t)],
(20)
with the phase angle θi(t) and angular frequency ωi(t) as system states (thus, the state
dimension is n = 136) and an actuator attack signal da,i(t). The power flow between
neighboring buses (i, j) ∈ E is given by P ijtie(t) = −P jitie(t) = tij(θi(t) − θj(t)), while the
mechanical power and power demand are denoted as PMi(t) and PLi(t), respectively.
The mechanical power PMi(t) is the control input for the generator bus i ∈ G and is
zero at load bus i ∈ L. On the other hand, since power demand PLi(t) can be obtained
using load forecasting methods (e.g., [Alfares and Nazeeruddin 2002]), it is assumed
to be a known input to the system. It is assumed that the noise wi(t) is a zero-mean
Gaussian signal with covariance matrix Qi(t) = 0.01 and the system parameters are
adopted from [Kundur et al. 1994, page 598]: Di = 1, tij = 1.5 for all i ∈ V, j ∈ Si
and tij = 0 otherwise. Angular momentums are mi = 10 for i ∈ G and a larger value
mi = 100 for load buses i ∈ L.
Fig. 7: IEEE 68-bus test system with locations of potential actuator signal and
mode/transmission line attacks (adapted from [Pal and Chaudhuri 2006]).
22 S.Z. Yong et al.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
(a) Posterior mode probabilities.
0 1 2 3 4 5
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
(b) Actuator attack signal estimates.
Fig. 8: Estimates of attack signal and mode probabilities when the attack mode
switches from q = 2 to q = 5 at 2.5 s in Example 7.2.
The measurements are sampled at discrete times (with sampling time ∆t = 0.01s):
yi,k = [Pelec,i,k θi,k ωi,k]
>
+ vi,k, (21)
where Pelec,i,k = Diωi,k + PLi,k is the electrical power output and vi,k is a zero-mean
Gaussian noise signal with covariance matrix Ri(t) = 0.014I3. The continuous system
dynamics (20) is also discretized with a sampling time of ∆t = 0.01s so that it is com-
patible with the measurement model. Moreover, in this example, we choose stabilizing
control inputs PMi,k and PLi,k to regulate the phase angles to θi = 10 rad with system
eigenvalues at −0.05 using standard linear control design tools, which is combined
with the attack-mitigating controller described in Theorem 6.1.
The attacker could launch actuator attacks and mode/transmission line attacks as
shown in Figure 7. For this case study, we consider 8 potential attacks modes (|Q| = 8):
Mode q = 1. Lines {27,53},{53,54},{60,61} & actuator G1.
Mode q = 2. Lines {18,49},{18,50} & actuator G2.
Mode q = 3. Line {40,41} & actuator G3.
Mode q = 4. Lines {18,49},{18,50},{27,53},{53,54},{60,61} & actuator G4.
Mode q = 5. Lines {27,53},{40,41},{53,54},{60,61} & actuator G5.
Mode q = 6. Lines {18,49},{18,50},{40,41} & actuator G6.
Mode q = 7. Lines {18,49},{18,50},{27,53},{40,41},{53,54},{60,61} & actuator G7.
Mode q = 8. Actuator G8.
We consider a time-varying attack scenario where the attack mode is q = 2 for
t = [0, 2.5)s followed by q = 5 for t = [2.5, 5)s, while the actuator attack signal is given by
da,i = 10
3t for t = [0, 1.25)s, da,i = 103(2.5− t) for t = [1.25, 2.5)s and da,i = −500(t− 2.5)
for t = [2.5, 5)s. The goal of this case study is to demonstrate that our proposed ap-
proach can detect, identify and mitigate attacks. First, Figure 8a shows that the at-
tacks are almost instantaneously detected and the attack modes are quickly identified.
In addition, Figure 8b shows that the actuator attack signal is successfully identified
and similarly, all system states can be well estimated (not depicted for brevity). Finally,
the attack mitigation scheme is successful at keeping the phase angles regulated to 10
rad/s despite attacks, whereas in the absence of attack mitigation, the phase angles
can be significantly influenced by the attackers, as shown in Figure 9.
8. CONCLUSION
We addressed the problem of resilient state estimation for switching (mode/topology)
attacks and attacks on actuator and sensor signals of stochastic cyber-physical sys-
tems, which is especially important given the proliferation of the internet of things. We
first modeled the problem as a hidden mode switched linear stochastic system with un-
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Fig. 9: A comparison of system states with and without the proposed attack mitigation.
known inputs and showed that the multiple-model inference algorithm in [Yong et al.
2016a] is a suitable solution to these issues. Moreover, we provided an achievable up-
per bound on the maximum number of asymptotically correctable signal attacks and
also the maximum number of required models for the multiple-model approach. We
also found sufficient conditions for attack (un-)detectability and attack identification,
as well as designed an attack-mitigating feedback controller. Simulation examples, in-
cluding one with the IEEE 68-bus test system, demonstrated the effectiveness of our
approach for resilient estimation and attack identification and mitigation.
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APPENDIX
A.1. System Transformation
To obtain the mode-matched input and state estimator (2), (3) and (4), we will consider
a system transformation for the continuous system dynamics and output equation in
(1) for each mode qk [Yong et al. 2016b]. First, we rewrite the direct feedthrough matrix
Hk using singular value decomposition as Hk = [U1,k U2,k]
[
Σk 0
0 0
] [
V >1,k
V >2,k
]
, where Σk ∈
RpHk×pHk is a diagonal matrix of full rank, U1,k ∈ Rl×pHk , U2,k ∈ Rl×(l−pHk ), V1,k ∈
Rp×pHk and V2,k ∈ Rp×(p−pHk ) with pHk := rk(Hk), while Uk := [U1,k U2,k] and Vk :=
[V1,k V2,k] are unitary matrices. When there is no direct feedthrough, Σk, U1,k and V1,k
are empty matrices4, and U2,k and V2,k are arbitrary unitary matrices.
Moreover, we define two orthogonal components of the unknown input dk given by
d1,k = V
>
1,kdk, d2,k = V
>
2,kdk. (22)
Since Vk is unitary, dk = V1,kd1,k +V2,kd2,k. Thus, the continuous system dynamics and
output equation in (1) for each mode qk can be rewritten as
xk+1 = Akxk +Bkuk +GkV1,kd1,k +GkV2,kd2,k + wk
= Akxk +Bkuk +G1,kd1,k +G2,kd2,k + wk, (23)
yk = Ckxk +Dkuk +HkV1,kd1,k +HkV2,kd2,k + vk
= Ckxk +Dkuk +H1,kd1,k + vk, (24)
where G1,k := GkV1,k, G2,k := GkV2,k and H1,k := HkV1,k = U1,kΣk. Next, we decouple
the output yk using a nonsingular transformation Tk =
[
T>1,k T
>
2,k
]>
Tk =
[
IpHk −U>1,kRkU2,k(U>2,kRkU2,k)−1
0 I(l−pHk )
] [
U>1,k
U>2,k
]
(25)
to obtain z1,k ∈ RpHk and z2,k ∈ Rl−pHk given by
z1,k = T1,kyk = C1,kxk +D1,kuk + Σkd1,k + v1,k
z2,k = T2,kyk = C2,kxk +D2,kuk + v2,k
(26)
where C1,k := T1,kCk, C2,k := T2,kCk = U>2,kCk,D1,k := T1,kDk,D2,k := T2,kDk = U
>
2,kDk,
v1,k := T1,kvk and v2,k := T2,kvk = U>2,kvk. This system transformation essentially de-
couples the output equation involving yk into two components, one with a full rank
direct feedthrough matrix and the other without direct feedthrough. The transforma-
tion is also chosen such that the measurement noise terms for the decoupled outputs
are uncorrelated. The covariances of v1,k and v2,k are
R1,k := E[v1,kv>1,k] = T1,kRkT>1,k  0,
R2,k := E[v2,kv>2,k] = T2,kRkT>2,k = U>2,kRkU2,k  0,
R12,k := E[v1,kv>2,k] = T1,kRkT>2,k = 0, (27)
R12,(k,i) := E[v1,kv>2,i] = T1,kE[vkv>i ]T>2,i = 0, ∀k 6= i.
Moreover, v1,k and v2,k are uncorrelated with the initial state x0 and process noise wk.
4We adopt the convention that the inverse of an empty matrix is also an empty matrix and assume that
operations with empty matrices are possible.
